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Defining "Aggression": Why the
Preparatory Commission for the




In 1945 and 1946, the International Military Tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo indicted individuals for committing "crimes
against peace."1 Fifty-five years later, on the eve of the
International Criminal Court's ("ICC") inauguration, 2 many states
agree in theory that the ICC should exercise jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. States, however, cannot agree on a definition
* Counsel, International Justice Program, Human Rights Watch; L.L.M., Columbia
University School of Law (2002); J.D., N.Y.U. School of Law (1990); A.B., Amherst
College (1985). The author wishes to thank John L. Washburn and Jutta Bertram-
Nothnagel for their comments on this article. The views expressed in this article are solely
those of the author, and not Human Rights Watch.
1. MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 57 (Katherine E. Kurzman et al. eds., Bedford Books 1997);
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Historical review of
developments relating to aggression, prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1, at http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N01/709/63/
PDF/N0170963.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Secretariat's
Historical Review] at 86.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, Art.
126 (1998), at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited May 15, 2002)
[hereinafter ICC Statute] (requiring sixty ratifications before the ICC Statute may enter
into force). The required sixty instruments of ratification for the ICC to come into
existence were obtained on April 11, 2002. See Message from the Convenor, What's next
after 60 ratifications, (April 11, 2002) at http://www.iccnow.org/html/update20020411.html.
The ICC Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. See website of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2002).
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for aggression. 3 Thus, when the ICC commences, it will have
jurisdiction to prosecute aggression, but will be unable to do so
since the crime lacks a definition. 4 The difficulty of defining the
crime relates in part to determining when the ICC would have
jurisdiction to hear a case concerning aggression.5 Because the
Charter of the United Nations ("U.N. Charter") charges the
United Nations Security Council ("Security Council") with
determining when a state has committed aggression, difficult
questions arise. Should the ICC be able to prosecute an individual
for aggression before the Security Council determines that the
individual's state committed aggression? Additionally, what
happens when the Security Council fails to make any
determination at all?
Part I of this article provides an introduction to this topic and
raises the questions that will be addressed. Part II examines the
ways "aggression" has been defined in the charters of the
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and
Resolution 33146 of the United Nations General Assembly
("General Assembly"). It also explores the extent to which the
ICC Statute currently addresses the issue of aggression. Part III
examines the provisions of the U.N. Charter that grant authority
to the Security Council to determine when a state has committed
aggression, and how that could limit the ICC's ability to adjudicate
cases regarding individual responsibility. Part IV reviews various
alternatives presented at the meetings of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court ("Preparatory
Commission"), including proposals on a substantive definition of
the crime and proposals for determining when the ICC would
exercise jurisdiction. Part V comments on the proposals, examines
whether there are viable alternatives to prosecuting aggression,
and analyzes whether there are methods to minimize the dangers
of inconsistent and politically motivated decisions interfering with
the ICC's jurisdiction over the crime.
This article concludes that under the U.N. Charter, it seems
inevitable that the Security Council, or possibly the General
3. Lelia Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381,437 (2000). See also infra Part II.C.
4. Sadat & Carden, supra note 3, at 437.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-43, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 3314 or Resolution 3314].
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Assembly, will be involved in determining state responsibility for
aggression before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction. Involving
political bodies in determining when the ICC will hear cases,
however, could be problematic. While the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") could be involved in such determinations, it
probably cannot be the sole decision-making body addressing state
responsibility given the explicit wording of the U.N. Charter.
States should, however, continue to work on defining the crime of
aggression, with the goal of adopting a definition that is both
consistent with the U.N. Charter and minimizes the potential for
undue interference with the ICC's jurisdiction.
II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE AGGRESSION
A. The International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
("Nuremberg Tribunal") prosecuted individuals for the crime of
aggression. 7 Additional prosecutions in Germany after World
War II, pursuant to Allied Control Council Law No. 10, and
prosecutions at the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East ("Tokyo Tribunal") closely followed. 8 The Nuremberg
Tribunal convicted twelve defendants of "crimes against peace,"
seven of whom were hanged.9 Additionally, the Tokyo Tribunal
convicted twenty-four defendants on the same charge, 10 six of
whom were hanged. 11
7. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 39 (Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. 1992). See generally Secretariat's Historical Review, supra note 1
(providing a comprehensive review of the history and development of law relating to
aggression).
8. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International
Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1991).
9. MARRUS, supra note 1, at 58-70, 261. Eight of the twelve defendants were also
convicted of participating in a common plan or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression
(Count 1). Id. Five other defendants were hanged for committing war crimes (Count 3)
and/or crimes against humanity (Count 4). Id.
10. Sylvia A. Fernandez De Gurmendi, Completing the Work of the Preparatory
Commission: The Working Group on Aggression at the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, 25 Fordham Int'l L.J. 589,593 (2002).
11. See Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the
Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 373, 442. A
seventh defendant was hanged for ordering, authorizing or permitting atrocities (Count
54). Id.
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Historians have suggested that a primary focus-in fact,
probably the greatest focus of the trials before both tribunals-
was on the crime of aggression. 12 The Nuremberg Tribunal
explicitly emphasized the importance of prosecuting the crime of
aggression, stating in its judgment:
The charges of the Indictment that the defendants planned and
waged aggressive war are charges of the utmost gravity .... To
initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an
international crime; it is the supreme international crime
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within
itself the accumulated evil of the whole.
13
Unfortunately, the indictments, the charters of the
International Military Tribunals and the judgments fail to provide
much guidance as to what constitutes "aggression" or "crimes
against peace." The Nuremberg Charter merely defines "crimes
against peace" as "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law,
treaties, agreements or assurances."1 4 The Tokyo Charter only
differs in that it covers wars both "declared or undeclared.'
15
Neither charter, however, offers a specific definition for
"aggression" or "a war of aggression." 16 Both charters also define
as criminal "participation in a common plan or conspiracy [to
accomplish a war of aggression].' 7 Control Council Law No. 10
contains similar definitions.
18
12. See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 39. Fifty-two of the fifty-five counts of the
indictment submitted to the Tokyo Tribunal related to crimes against the peace. See
Secretariat's Historical Review, supra note 1, 271, at 86.
13. Lawrence D. Egbert, ed. Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 186 (1947) (emphasis
added).
14. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement),
August 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, at art. 6, available at
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/imt1945.htm (last visited May 15, 2002) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter].
15. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last visited May 6, 2002), at
art. 5 [hereinafter Tokyo Charter].
16. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 14, at art. 6; Tokyo Charter, supra note 15, at
art. 5.
17. Id. The Nuremberg Charter's use of the term "aggressive war" is anchored in
other sources of International Law: the unratified 1923 draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance;
the preamble to the 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; the
1927 resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations; and the Sixth International
442 [Vol. 24:439
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In 1946, the General Assembly affirmed in Resolution 95 "the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." 19 That
Resolution also directed the Committee on Codification of
International Law to codify "offences [sic] against the peace and
security of mankind" or an "International Criminal Code," based
on "the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."
20
B. General Assembly Resolution 3314
While discussions of the definition of aggression continued at
various special committees, 21 the General Assembly passed a
resolution defining aggression in 1973.22 The resolution focused,
however, on determining state, not individual, responsibility.
23
Specifically, Resolution 3314 defines aggression as "the use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in
Conference of American States in 1928. See Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive
Crimes within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What Is
the Crime of Aggression?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413,433 (2000).
18. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, art. 2(1)(a), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/imt/imtl0.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002). That law defines "crimes against
peace" as:
[ljnitiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of
international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning,
preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
Id. Military tribunals established in the American zone in Germany conducted 12 trials,
four of which dealt with charges of crimes against the peace-the I.G. Farben case, the
Krupp case, the High Command case, and the Ministries case. Secretariat's Historical
Review, supra note 1, 119, at 44. France established a similar tribunal in the French
zone of occupation; that tribunal adjudicated the Roechling case, which also involved such
charges. Id. 120, at 44.
19. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 175, U.N. Doc A/Res/95 (1946).
20. Id.
21. De Gurmendi, supra note 10, at 594.
22. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 6.
23. Id. at preamble (recommending that the Security Council "should, as appropriate,
take account of that Definition as guidance in determining, in accordance with the
Charter, the existence of an act of aggression."). The reference to "an act of aggression"
clearly pertains to the act of a state since, as discussed further below, the U.N. Charter
charges the Security Council with determining when a state has committed an act of
aggression. See Part III infra.
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this Definition." 24 It then lists a series of acts that qualify as an act
of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State
or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed
forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or
air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement... ;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other
State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State .... 25
The Resolution also provides that "[t]he acts enumerated above
are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that
other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the
Charter." 26
24. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 6, at 143.
25. Id.
26. Id. In addition, it states:
[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security
Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that
an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of
other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their




C. The ICC Statute-Holding A Place Open For Aggression
In 1991, the International Law Commission ("ILC")
published its Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind.27 Two years later, in 1993, the ILC drafted a
proposal for an international criminal court.28 The Code of
Offenses, however, contained only a- meager definition of
aggression, stating: "An individual who, as leader or organizer,
actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be
responsible for a crime of aggression. ' 29 From 1994 until 1998, the
international criminal court proposal was debated and changed,
culminating in negotiations held in Rome in June and July of 1998,
where the ICC Statute was finalized.30
At the Rome Conference, 31 delegates could not agree on a
definition for the crime of aggression. 32 They compromised by
including aggression in the ICC Statue as one of the crimes over
which the ICC will have jurisdiction 33 but did not provide a
definition of aggression. The ICC Statute states:
27. Henry King Jr., Commentary: The Modern Relevance of the Nuremberg Principles,
17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279,281 (1997).
28. Id. at 281. The ILC's efforts took so long to reach fruition because the Cold War
blocked progress on such efforts. See Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the
International Criminal Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome
Diplomatic Conference, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Jan.-Mar. 1999, at 1-2. See
Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 12 ("During the 'cold war' (1948-1989) countries on both sides
of the then iron curtain perceived the exigencies of national security at [sic] precluding
consideration of an international criminal court .... [Tihe real reason was that the two
superpowers engaged in acts violating international criminal law, as did their surrogates,
satellites and respective friendly countries.")
29. Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Report of the International Law
Commission, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996). See
Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F. 43 (1997) (discussing
the drafting of the Code of Crimes).
30. RUTH WEDGWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ICC, IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 119 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds.,
Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000).
31. The "Rome Conference" refers to the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See generally
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (Roy S.
Lee, ed., Kluwer Law International 1999) (providing a background on the ICC Statute and
the Rome Conference).
32. Id. at 84-85.
33. ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 5(1).
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The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with
articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction
with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations.
34
Pursuant to Articles 121 and 123 of the ICC Statute, the member
states may amend the statute seven years after it enters into
force.
35
It was agreed that, at Preparatory Commission meetings
following the Rome Conference, 36 states would resolve additional
items needed before the ICC could commence operations,
including the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Elements of
Crimes and other documents supplemental to the ICC Statute.
During the ten Preparatory Commission sessions held,37 states
have agreed on, among other things, the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence38 and Elements of Crimes, 39 but have failed to agree on
a definition of aggression. Because the Preparatory Commission
meetings have now concluded, the issue of defining aggression will
be handled by a "special working group on the crime of
34. Id. at art. 5(2).
35. Id. at art. 121, 123. At that time, any amendment would have to be voted in by
two-thirds of the States Parties, and would enter into force only if ratified by seven-eights
of them, but, would not enter into force for states who did not accept the amendment. De
Gurmendi, supra note 10, at 604 (citing ICC Statute, art. 121).
36. The Preparatory Commission was established by the General Assembly, as
requested by, and with the mandate established in Resolution F of the Rome Conference.
Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 28, at 3. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Resolution
F, the Preparatory Commission consisted of representatives of States that signed the Final
Act at the Rome Conference, and other States that were invited to participate at the
Rome Conference. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipolentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Resolution F,
at http://www.un.orgllaw/ICC/prepcomm/prepfra.htm (last visited May 15, 2002).
37. The tenth and final session of the Preparatory Commission was held at the United
Nations from July 1 to July 12, 2002. See webcite of the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2002).
38. Finalized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted by the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court at its 2 3d meeting on June
30, 2000, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/elements/elemfra.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2002).
39. Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, adopted by the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court at its 23rd meeting on June 30, 2000, at
http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/statute/elements/elemfra.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
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aggression."40 The goal is to eventually amend the ICC Statute to
define the crime and allow prosecutions to occur.
III. THE MANDATE IN THE ICC STATUTE TO DEFINE
AGGRESSION-DRIVEN BY THE U.N. CHARTER
As described above, the ICC Statute sets forth two separate
mandates regarding the crime of aggression. They are (a)
"defining the crime" and (b) "setting out the conditions under
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to th[e]
crime." 41  The ICC Statute also specifically requires that any
provision "shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations."42  Upon examining the U.N.
Charter, the reason for the two separate mandates becomes clear.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter enshrines the basic principle
of non-aggression. 43 It provides: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 44  Article 24(1) of the Charter then gives "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security" to the Security Council.45  Additionally, Article 39
provides:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken.., to maintain or restore international peace and
security.4
6
40. It is planned that the working group, which would be open to all member States of
the U.N., will meet during regular sessions of the Assembly of States Parties. See Draft
resolution of the Assembly of States Parties on the continuity of work in respect of the
crime of aggression, in Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court (continued), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, found at http://www.un.org/
law/iccprepcomm/prepfra.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002), at 2. That draft resolution was
adopted at the first Assembly of States Parties.
41. ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 5(2).
42. Id.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
44. Id.
45. Id. at art. 24.
46. Id. at art. 39 (emphasis added).
2002]
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From these provisions stems the conundrum that has faced
states at the Preparatory Commissions meetings.47 First, if the
Security Council "shall determine the existence of any.., act of
aggression,"48 i.e., an act of aggression by a state, while the ICC
only has jurisdiction over "natural persons," 49 what is the
interrelationship between the ICC and the Security Council?
Stated another way, can the ICC only adjudicate individual
responsibility after the Security Council has determined that a
defendant's state committed aggression? If so, does the ICC
commence its own factual inquiry as to whether aggression
occurred, or is it bound to follow the Security Council's
determination? Second, what if the Security Council fails to make
a determination? Under Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter, the
Security Council only has the primary responsibility of ensuring
international peace and security. 50 Can another body such as the
General Assembly or the ICJ act when the Security Council fails
to do so?
IV. ATTEMPTS AT THE ICC's PREPARATORY COMMISSION
MEETINGS TO DEFINE AGGRESSION
In various proposals made at Preparatory Commission
meetings, states have attempted to define the crime of aggression
and establish procedures to trigger the ICC's jurisdiction regarding
the crime.
A. Attempts to Define the Crime
Most proposals for defining the crime address two issues: (1)
the crime the individual commits, and (2) the act by the state of
aggression. Thus, only when the individual commits the acts in the
context of state aggression would criminal responsibility follow.
47. The argument has been made that the reason a determination whether a state
committed aggression must be made prior to any determination of individual
responsibility is that aggression is unlike any other crime: it is essentially something only a
state can do to another state. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Deterring Aggression by Law-A
Compromise Proposal, at http://www.benferencz.org/defined.htm (last visited Jan. 11,
2001).
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
49. ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 25(1) ("[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction over
natural persons pursuant to this Statute."). Article 1 similarly provides that the Court
"shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern ..... Id at art. 1 (emphasis added).
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 24 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 24:439
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While there have been differences in terms of proposals
regarding the individual's acts, the greatest conceptual differences
concern the extent to which the state's act of aggression would be
addressed. States have debated three basic approaches to defining
the state's act of aggression. The first approach uses a generic
definition that would define state aggression.51  The second
approach is to adopt the approach taken by the General Assembly
in Resolution 3314, and enumerate acts constituting state
aggression.52 The third approach does not define the act of
aggression at all, leaving the matter completely to the
determination of the Security Council. 53
In addition to these overriding differences of approach, there
are numerous other complex issues, including: (a) whether the
definition should encompass only a "war of aggression," so that it
is limited to the most serious instances of aggression, to the
exclusion of less serious acts such as border skirmishes; (b)
whether the definition, alternatively, should be couched in terms
of the "use of [armed] force" or "an armed attack" since those
terms are used in the U.N. Charter 54 and Resolution 3314;55 (c)
whether the crime should be a "leadership crime" and focus only
on those in positions of control capable of directing political or
military actions of the state; (d) whether attempts or threats to
commit aggression should be criminalized; (e) whether there
should be an explicit exception for self-defense of a state; (f)
whether there should be a humanitarian exception if the rights
and/or principle of self-determination of peoples are violated;56 (g)
whether the definition should cover non-state actors; (h) what type
of mens rea is required; and (i) what type of actus reus triggers
responsibility. 5
7
51. See infra Part IV.A.1.
52. See infra Part IV.A.2.
53. See infra Part IV.A.3.
54. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). See also id. at art. 51 (entitling a state to resort to
individual or collective self-defense in response to an "armed attack").
55. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 6, at art. 1.
56. For instance, Benjamin B. Ferencz has advocated for an explicit exception
covering humanitarian intervention. See Ferencz, supra note 47.
57. For example, in terms of actus reus, it would need to be decided whether it would
be criminal to "initiate or carry out" aggression, or also to "plan or prepare" to commit
aggression. See U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.4/Rev. 1, at 13-14 [hereinafter Consolidated Proposal].
2002]
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At the third Preparatory Commission session, a Consolidated
Proposal was issued that reflected work done prior to, during and
following the Rome Conference. 58 The Consolidated Proposal
encompasses each of the various approaches to defining
aggression. The proposed language in the different versions
reflects some of the substantive issues implicated. Below are
discussed: (1) the generic approach in which the act of aggression
is newly defined; (2) the enumerative approach that relies on the
approach taken by the General Assembly in Resolution 3314; and
(3) an approach that leaves the definition of the act of aggression
solely to the Security Council's discretion.
1. The Generic Approach
Variations 1 and 2 of Option 1 of the Consolidated Proposal
use a generic approach. This generic approach would define the
individual's crime (Option 1), and then define the required context
- i.e., the state's acts (Variations 1 and 2):
Option 1
1. For the purposes of the present Statute, [and subject to a
determination by the Security Council regarding the act of a
State,] the crime of aggression means [the use of the armed
force, including the initiation thereof, by an individual who is in
a position of exercising control or directing the political or
military action of a State, against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of a State in violation of the
Charter of the United Nations.] any of the following acts
committed by [an individual][a person] who is in a position of
exercising control or capable of directing the political or




[an armed attack] [the use of armed force] [a war of aggression]
[a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of
58. For the full text of the relevant parts of the Consolidated Proposal, see Appendix A.
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the foregoing] against another State [against another State, or
depriving other peoples of their rights to self-determination], in
[manifest] contravention of the Charter of the United Nations,
to violate [to threaten or to violate] the [sovereignty,] territorial
integrity or political independence of that State [or the
inalienable rights of those people] [except when this is required
by the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples and the rights of individual or collective self-defence
[sic]]
Variation 2
an armed attack directed by a State against the territorial
integrity or political independence of another State when this
armed attack was undertaken in manifest contravention of the
Charter of the United Nations with the object or result of
establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory
of such other State or part thereof by armed forces of the
attacking State.
59
In addition, Greece and Portugal made a fairly well received
proposal (the "Greece/Portugal Proposal") containing the
following generic definition:
For the purposes of the present Statute, aggression means the
use of armed force, including the initiation thereof, by an
individual who is in a position of exercising control or directing
the political or military action of a State, against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of a
State in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
60
A somewhat more detailed, generic definition was proposed
in the fall of 2001 by Bosnia, Herzegovina, New Zealand and
Romania at the Eighth Preparatory Commission Session.61 That
proposal, which clearly differentiates between the individual's
crime and the state's act of aggression, states:
1. A person commits the crime of aggression who, being in a
position to exercise control over or direct the political or
military action of a State, intentionally and knowingly orders or
59. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 13.
60. The Greece/Portugal Proposal is identified as U.N. Doc. PCNICC2000/WGCA/DP5. It
was previously identified as U.N. Doc. PCNICCt1999/WGCA/DP.1.
61. For the relevant parts of the Bosnia, Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania
proposal for the definition of the crime of aggression, see U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2.
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participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of aggression committed by that State.
2. For the purposes of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court
over the crime of aggression under the Statute, aggression
committed by a State means the use of armed force to attack
the territorial integrity or political independence of another
State in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
62
2. The General Assembly's Enumerative Approach
Another approach contained in the Consolidated Proposal,
and, most recently, the Coordinator's Discussion Paper from the
Ninth and Tenth Preparatory Commission Sessions,63 is to either
incorporate the definition of state aggression contained in
Resolution 3314, or to incorporate that resolution by reference.
Thereby, the ICC would rely on the General Assembly's definition
of state aggression.
Thus, Variation 3 of the Consolidated Proposal adds to
Option 1 a list of acts that, when committed with sufficient gravity,
would constitute aggression by a state.64 The acts are essentially
identical to those listed in Resolution 3314.65 Brackets in the text
of Variation 3 suggest that one possibility is to make the list
closed-ended, thereby having the list contain all possible types of
aggression. Another possibility is to leave it open-ended, making
the list illustrative of the types of aggression but leaving 'open the
possibility of including other forms of aggression.
The most recent formulation of this approach is contained in
the Coordinator's Discussion Paper, which provides:
1. For the purposes of the present Statute, a person commits a
'crime of aggression' when, being in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action
of a State, that person intentionally and knowingly orders or
participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or
execution of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity
62. Id.
63. See Discussion Paper proposed by the Coordinator, in Report of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court (continued), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, found at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2002) at 3-5 [hereinafter Coordinator's Discussion Paper].
64. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 14.
65. See supra, Part II.B. See Appendix A for the full text of Variation 3.
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and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the
United Nations....
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, 'act of aggression' means an
act referred to in United Nations General Assembly resolution
3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which is determined to
have been committed by the State concerned .... 66
3. The Leave-It-to-the-Security Council Approach
A final option contained in the Consolidated Proposal leaves
the act of aggression solely to be determined and defined by the
Security Council. This option provides:
Option 2
For the purposes of the present Statute and subject to a prior
determination by the United Nations Security Council of an act
of aggression by the State concerned, the crime of aggression
means any of the following acts: planning, preparing, initiating
or carrying out a war of aggression. 67
B. Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction
The second and even more difficult issue is to establish
conditions prefatory to the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction. Various
proposals address this issue. The proposals include: (1) requiring
the Security Council to make the determination of whether state
aggression occurred, and if the Security Council did not find
aggression occurred, the ICC could not act; (2) providing that the
ICC can act if the Security Council fails to make a determination;
(3) having the General Assembly make the determination if the
Security Council does not; and (4) having the ICJ make the
determination if the Security Council does not.
1. The Security Council Must Make the Determination
The first option is to require the Security Council to make a
determination of whether a state has committed an act of
66. Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 63, at 1-2. The word "effectively"
was added to paragraph 1 based on a proposal of Belgium, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and
Thailand, U.N. Doc. PCNICCI2002/WGCA/DP.5. The goal is to ensure that those who in
fact control the state and military, and not those who do so in title alone, bear
responsibility.
67. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 14.
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aggression before the ICC could proceed. Thus, Option 1 of the
Consolidated Proposal provides that "[t]he Security Council shall
determine the existence of an act of aggression.., before
proceedings take place in the Court with regard to the crime of
aggression." 68 Under that option, the Security Council would have
either six or twelve months from the ICC's request to make its
determination. 69 If the Security Council did not make a finding of
aggression, the ICC could not hear the case.7
0
2. If the Security Council Fails to Act, the ICC may Proceed
A second option is that if the Security Council does not act
within a required time, the ICC may proceed. Thus, Variation 1 of
Option 1 provides that in the absence of a Security Council
decision within the required time frame, the ICC can proceed. 71 It
also states that "[t]he decision of the Security Council ... shall not
be interpreted as in any way affecting the independence of the
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction .. .. "72 The
Greece/Portugal Proposal takes the same approach, providing that
if the Security Council fails to make a determination within twelve
months, the ICC can proceed. 73
3. If the Security Council Fails to Act, the Issue Goes to the
General Assembly
A third option is that if the Security Council fails to act within
a certain time, the matter would go to the General Assembly.
Thus, Variation 2 of the Consolidated Proposal on the conditions
68. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 15. The Security Council has adopted
resolutions condemning aggression by a state on several occasions. See Secretariat's
Historical Review, supra note 1, 383-88, 115-16 (discussing Security Council
resolutions condemning aggression by Southern Rhodesia); id. IT 389-98, 117-19
(aggression by South Africa); id. 399, 120 (aggression against Benin); id. 400-402,
120-21 (aggression by Israel against Tunesia); id. 404, 121 ("aggressive acts" by Iraq
against Kuwait).
69. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 15.
70. The Coordinator's Discussion Paper also includes this option. See Coordinator's
Discussion Paper, supra note 63, 5, option 2.
71. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 15.
72. Id. Option 2 of the Consolidated Proposal on the conditions for the exercise of
jurisdiction, which is not discussed herein, is similar to Option 1, Variation 1. Option 3 is
also not discussed because it is similar to Option 1.
73. See Greece/Portugal Proposal, supra note 60, 4. This approach is also reflected
in the Coordinator's Discussion Paper, see Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 63,
5, option 1 (requiring action within six months).
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for the exercise of jurisdiction provides that in the absence of
Security Council action within the required time frame, the ICC
may request the General Assembly to make a recommendation. 74
The General Assembly would have twelve months to act.75 If it
failed to do so, the ICC would be free to proceed. 76 Variation 2
further states that the recommendation of the General Assembly
"shall not be interpreted as in any way affecting the independence
of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction .... 77
4. If the Security Council Fails to Act, the Issue Could Go to the
International Court of Justice
A fourth option is that if the Security Council does not act
within a certain time, the issue could go to the ICJ. Thus, under
proposals by Bosnia, Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania,
the Security Council would be charged with determining whether a
state had committed aggression. If the Security Council failed to
make such a determination within a certain period of time, the
ICC could request the General Assembly to ask the ICJ78 for an
advisory opinion.79 The Coordinator's Discussion Paper provides
that either the General Assembly or Security Council acting on
vote of any nine members could ask the ICJ for an advisory
opinion. 80
74. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 15-16. The General Assembly has
adopted resolutions condemning aggression in a number of situations. For an example of
such a determination, see Secretariat's Historical Review, supra note 1, 415, 123-24
(discussing resolutions condemning aggression by China against Korea).
75. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 15.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 15-16. This approach is also reflected in the Coordinator's Discussion
Paper, see Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 63, 1 5, option 3.
78. The ICJ has opined on issues related to aggression, especially in the context of
ordering provisional measures. See Secretariat's Historical Review, supra note 1, 9 444-
50, 132-34 (discussing cases). Both the General Assembly and the Security Council may
request advisory opinions from the ICJ "on any legal issue." U.N. CHARTER art. 96
79. Under the first proposal, after the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion, the General
Assembly could recommend that the ICC Prosecutor proceed. U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.I, 914-5 [herinafter BH I Proposal]. The second proposal
eliminates this step, enabling the ICC to proceed once the ICJ renders an advisory opinion
determining that aggression occurred. U.N. Doc. PCNICCI2001IWGCAIDP.2, 16(a)
[herinafter BH II Proposal].
80. Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 63, 1 5, option 4. The approach of
having nine members of the Security Council vote derives from a proposal by the
Netherlands, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCAIDP.1 [hereinafter "Netherlands
Proposal"]. Thus, the Security Council's voting would be treated as a procedural, not a
substantive, matter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. (2)-(3) (voting on procedural
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The BH II Proposal also permits the ICC to hear a case of
aggression if the Security Council fails to make a determination
and the ICJ, as part of a contentious case, decides that a state
committed aggression.
81
V. DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSALS AND ALTERNATIVE IDEAS
At the Preparatory Commission meetings, states have
engaged in extensive discussions of these and other proposals.
Below is a discussion of some of the advantages and disadvantages
of the proposals.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Proposals on the
Definition of Aggression
The generic approach to defining an act of aggression has
various advantages and disadvantages. The generic approach is
beneficial because it does not limit determinations to any specific
instances and thus, is able to cover situations not specifically
enumerated, and thus newly devised forms of aggression. There
may be some concern whether a generic definition, however,
would provide a defendant with sufficient notice of the acts
covered to satisfy the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.82 Since
the acts involved in planning aggression are not inherently bad acts
and depend on context-i.e., the same acts could be criminal if
undertaken during an offensive military engagement, but
legitimate if undertaken during a state's self defense-one must be
especially mindful of such concerns.
The enumerative approach of Resolution 3314, especially if
the list of acts covered is closed-ended provides clearest notice, but
would restrict the ICC in the event a potential defendant commits
another form of aggression. If states agree upon a closed-ended
list, the Preparatory Commission must give serious consideration
to whether the list of acts in Resolution 3314 is complete and
matters requires nine votes; voting on substantive matters requires nine votes and
concurring votes of Permanent Members).
81. BH II Proposal, supra note 79, 6(b). This approach is also reflected in the
Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 63, 5, option 5.
82. The ICC Statute specifically recognizes this principle in a section entitled
"General Principles of Criminal Law." Specifically, Article 22(2) provides that "[t]he
definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy," and
that "[in case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted." ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 22(2).
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thorough.83 An open-ended list has the benefit of encompassing
other forms of aggression, but would also raise questions as to
notice regarding acts not specifically enumerated. Resolution 3314
is appealing because the General Assembly has already agreed on
the list of acts it contains. The General Assembly, however, did
not adopt Resolution 3314 with criminal responsibility in mind.84
In fact, the concept of listing acts that illustrate aggression, as
Resolution 3314 does, seems anathema to the specificity and
completeness with which criminal law should be defined.85
Option 2 of the definition of the crime 86 is more problematic
because it essentially leaves the definition of the crime in the
Security Council's hands. In Option 2, aggression is basically not
defined.87 Instead, it is left to the Security Council to determine
whether aggression has occurred, with the ICC determining
whether "planning, preparing, initiating or carrying out a war of
aggression" has occurred. There is good reason to disfavor this
option, which has not been included in any of the more recent
proposals. First, Option 2 arguably fails to provide a potential
defendant with notice of the acts constituting aggression. Second,
Option 2 suggests that the Security Council determination binds
the ICC, which presumably means the ICC could not make any
independent inquiry into whether aggression occurred. If the ICC
prosecutor does not need to prove that aggression occurred,
serious concerns arise whether the defendant would be deprived of
the presumption of innocence, the opportunity to rebut the case
against him, and other fair trial protections. 88
83. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 6, at art. 3.
84. See id. at preamble.
85. Resolution 3314 also allows the Security Council to determine that acts that
would otherwise constitute aggression do not if the acts are "justified in the light of other
relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences
are not of sufficient gravity." Id. at art. 2. This type of language is also problematic for
defining criminal responsibility.
86. See Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 14.
87. Id Option 2 on the definition of the crime is identical to Option 3 on the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 16.
88. See ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 66 (presumption of innocence; onus on the
prosecutor to prove guilt; requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); id. at art.
67(1)(e); (the right to examine witnesses and raise defenses); id. at art. 67(1)(i); (defendant
entitled not to have any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal). If a
defendant is charged with aggression, one would expect proof that: (a) aggression
occurred, and (b) the defendant, both in terms of his acts and his mental state, was
sufficiently involved to warrant individual criminal responsibility. Thus, if the Security
2002]
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As to the substantive wording of the definition, Germany
issued a proposal addressing several important issues. 89 Germany
argues that in the past, especially at Nuremberg and Tokyo, only a
"war of aggression" was criminalized. 90 There is, however, merit
in including more than full-scale wars in the definition. Aggression
does not usually start out as a full-scale war and potential
perpetrators could perceive criminalizing only a "war of
aggression" as giving a green light to lesser forms of attack, such as
border incursions. Moreover, the U.N. Charter not only prohibits
wars of aggression, but prohibits "the threat or use of force" 91 and
provides that an "armed attack" justifies the use of self-defense. 92
Germany also endorses the widely accepted view that
aggression should only be a "leadership crime." 93  This is
Council solely determined the definition of aggression, it would seem to obviate proof of
half the case, and deprive the defendant of the chance to rebut that proof.
89. U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.4 [hereinafter German Position Paper].
Germany's labeling its paper a "proposal" is a misnomer, since the document contains no
new proposal, but instead advances Germany's views on various issues. Id.
90. Id. at 4-6. For a comprehensive discussion of when the following terms have been
invoked as criminal in the context of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, and
trials pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, see Historical Review of Developments
Relating to Aggression, prepared by the Secretariat, Addendum, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1, http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/prepfra.htm (last
visited May 16, 2002) [hereinafter Secretariat's Historical Review Addendum], Table 1-2
(discussing the following terms: aggression, acts of aggression, act of war, act of aggressive
war, war of aggression, war in violation of treatises, threat of force, armed attack, invasion,
occupation, annexation or incorporation and war).
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Presumably, the ICC Prosecutor will not waste the ICC's
time with de minimis violations since the jurisdiction of the ICC only covers the "most
serious crimes." ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 1. Some states have suggested that only
"manifest" breaches of the U.N. Charter be covered so that humanitarian intervention
would not count as aggression. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 13. Not only is it
unclear what breaches would be "manifest," that goal could be achieved, however, in
other ways. For example, if aggression is defined as involving action against the
"territorial integrity or political independence" of a state that would presumably exclude
humanitarian intervention, which should have neither aim.
93. German Position Paper, supra note 89, at 7. See also Proceedings of the
Preparatory Commission at its Seventh Session (Feb. 26-Mar. 9 2001), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC2001/L.1/Rev.1 at 20 (noting that the principal that aggression is committed by
political or military leaders seems to enjoy "widespread support"). Prosecuting those in a
"leadership" position is also supported by the precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals, which only prosecuted major war criminals. See, e.g., Secretariat's Historical
Review, supra note 1, at 123, 45. Prosecutors under Control Council Law No. 10 also
were limited to persons holding high-level political, civil, military, financial, industrial or
economic positions. Id.
In explaining why aggression should be a "leadership crime," the decision in the I.G.
Farben case states:
458
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consistent with the ICC's jurisdiction to prosecute the "most
serious crimes of international concern" 94 and presumably, those
most responsible. Additionally, Germany argues that the
definition should not include attempts to commit aggression. 95
Considering that a prerequisite to the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction
will most likely be a determination that aggression by a state has
occurred, it would make no sense to criminalize a "threat" or
"attempt" that does not lead to such an act. Without an act of
aggression, the ICC would not have jurisdiction to hear such a
case.9
6
B. Issues Concerning Proposals on the Conditions for the
Exercise of Jurisdiction
Even more difficult issues are implicated regarding the
conditions for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction. Although a
variety of issues in the different proposals warrant consideration, 97
We cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in the position of being
compelled to determine in the heat of war whether his Government is right or
wrong, or, if it starts right, when it turns wrong. We would not require the
citizen, at the risk of becoming a criminal under the rules of international justice,
to decide that his country has become an aggressor and that he must lay aside his
patriotism, the loyalty to his homeland and the defence [sic] of his own fireside
at the risk of being adjudged guilty of crimes against peace on the one hand, or
of becoming a traitor to his country on the other, if he makes an erroneous
decision based upon facts of which he has but vague knowledge.
Secretariat's Historical Review, supra note 1, 137, at 49, quoting United States v. Krauch
(the L G. Farben case), in Trials of War Criminals before the Ntimberg Military Tribunals,
United States Government Printing Office (1952), vol. VIII, at 1126. For a compilation of
past jurisprudence regarding the responsibility of leaders, policy makers, decision makers
and high level officials, see Secretariat's Historical Review Addendum, supra note 90,
Table 5 (concluding that "the relevant criterion is not a person's title, rank or position but
rather the ability to exercise the attributes of power that accompany a high-level
position").
94. ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 1.
95. German Position Paper, supra note 89, at 7.
96. The Coordinator's Discussion Paper appropriately proposes that certain articles
of the Rome Statute, including article 25(f)(3), which provides that taking "a substantial
step" to committing a crime that does not occur creates criminal exposure, would not
apply to the crime of aggression. See Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 63, 3.
97. For instance, as to Option 1, Variation 1 of the Consolidated Proposal on the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction and the Greece/Portugal Proposal, a question
arises whether any automatic fallback to the ICC without a prior determination that a
state committed aggression would violate the U.N. Charter's requirement that the Security
Council make such determinations. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 15;
Greece/Portugal Proposal, supra note 60, 4. As to the BH I Proposal and BH II
Proposal, there are concerns whether it would be consistent with the ICJ Statute to have
the ICJ render an advisory opinion regarding aggression vis-a-vis a state that had not
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a more overriding problem is inherent in all the proposals. All the
proposals, to some degree, run the risk of politicized and
inconsistent determinations, and thus, piecemeal application of the
law. These risks, however, may be unavoidable given the
mandates of the U.N. Charter.
1. Does Involving a Political Body in the Process Allow for
Neutral Application of Justice?
The notion of a court, such as the ICC, having to obtain
approval from a political body such as the Security Council or the
General Assembly, before it may proceed with a case seems
contrary to the goal of achieving justice. Justice should apply
equally to all on an apolitical basis. 98 There is a clear danger that
aggression might occur, but, for political reasons, the Security
Council (for example, due to the veto of a Permanent Member) or
the General Assembly does not denominate it as such.
Consequently, ICC prosecution would be blocked based on a
political decision, having little or nothing to do with culpability.
99
consented to the ICJ's jurisdiction. Comments of the United States on the BH I Proposal,
Notes of the Seventh Preparatory Commission Meeting, Session on the Crime of
Aggression, prepared by the Coalition for an International Criminal Court ("CICC")
(Mar. 6, 2001) (notes of the author); see BH I Proposal, supra note 79; BH I Proposal,
supra note 79. Several states have also expressed concern whether using the ICJ would
unduly delay proceedings. See ICC Statute, Art. 67(c) (requiring trial "without undue
delay").
98. Cf. THEODOR MERON, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, in
WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 229-230 (Clarendon Press-Oxford 1998) (discussing,
in the context of international humanitarian law, the importance of a "uniform and
definite corpus" of law "that can be applied apolitically... everywhere.").
99. This is not the only situation where political determinations could impact upon
the ICC. Under Article 16 of the ICC Statute, an ICC investigation or prosecution may be
deferred for twelve-month renewable periods by request of the Security Council. See ICC
Statute, supra note 2, at art. 16. Under the ICC Statute the deferral must be made by the
Security Council "in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII." Id. Thus, deferrals should
only occur where necessary for international peace and security. An Article 16 deferral
poses less of a threat to judicial independence than a decision regarding an act of
aggression. A positive vote of the Security Council (subject to veto by the permanent
members) could be required to defer a prosecution, whereas, regarding an act of
aggression, a positive vote (subject to veto by the permanent members) would be required
to proceed. The Security Council has also given a one year exemption from ICC
jurisdiction for peacekeepers from states that have not ratified the ICC Statute. See
Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002). The United States is also in the process of
demanding that states sign bilateral agreements not to turn over U.S. citizens to the ICC.
See United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court: Legal Analysis
of Impunity Agreements, Human Rights Watch, at http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/
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To analogize to the U.S. justice system, it would be as if for a
certain type of crime, the Executive branch or Congress would be
able to decide whether individual prosecutions should occur. This
situation, however, would constitute overreaching by the
Executive branch or Congress and violate the separation of powers
doctrine.
Although, with the Security Council, there would be no
question of overreaching since the U.N. Charter empowers the
Security Council to determine acts of aggression100 and there is at
least some basis for the General Assembly acting,10 1 there are till
concerns about undermining the ICC's independence and
preventing consistent and impartial application of the law.
Although Variations 1 and 2 of the Consolidated Proposal on the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction state that decisions by
the Security Council or General Assembly "shall not be
interpreted as in any way affecting the independence of the
Court," 10 2 it is unclear why such decisions would not affect the
ICC's independence. If a clear case of aggression never reached
the ICC because of the actions (or inactions) of those bodies, it
art98analysis.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (arguing such agreements are inconsistent
with obligations of States Parties under the Rome Statute).
100. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
101. There is a basis for permitting the General Assembly to act if the Security Council
fails to do so. Article 10 of the U.N. Charter empowers the General Assembly to "discuss
any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter" and "make
recommendations" regarding them, "except as provided in Article 12 ..." U.N. CHARTER
art. 10. Article 12 provides that the General Assembly may not act "[w]hile the Security
Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in
the present Charter..." U.N. CHARTER art. 12. Thus, in theory, if the Security Council is
not exercising the functions assigned to it, the General Assembly could do so. Article 24
also provides that the "[m]embers confer on the Security Council" only "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security..." U.N. CHARTER
art. 24 (emphasis added). Moreover, in the so-called "Uniting for Peace" Resolution,
precedent was set for permitting the General Assembly to act in situations of Security
Council deadlock:
[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly
shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations.., for collective measures ....
G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 20, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950)
(emphasis added). See also Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151,
163 (July 20) (stating "[t]he Charter makes it abundantly clear, however, that the
General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security.").
102. Consolidated Proposal, supra note 57, at 15-16.
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would affect the ICC's independence. Accordingly, the credibility
of the ICC regarding prosecutions for aggression would very much
depend on the way the Security Council and/or General Assembly
make determinations as to state responsibility.
A second, subordinate risk of having a determination of
aggression made by two different bodies is the risk of inconsistent
determinations. The language in Variations 1 and 2 of the
Consolidated Proposal, which states that a prior decision as to an
act of aggression should not be interpreted as "affecting the
independence" of the ICC103 implies that the ICC should
commence its own inquiry as to whether aggression occurred for
purposes of determining individual responsibility. Additionally,
the ICC Prosecutor arguably needs to prove that aggression
occurred in order to prove a case against a defendant, and give the
defendant an opportunity to rebut that proof. 10 4 Yet, having the
ICC re-evaluate whether aggression occurred clearly risks the ICC
coming to a different conclusion. 1
05
Involving the ICJ does not fully solve either problem. Under
both the BH I Proposal and BH II Proposal, the General
Assembly could refer the question of whether state aggression
occurred to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. 10 6 While that is
advantageous because a judicial body, not a political one, would
decide the matter, it does not entirely eliminate the potential for
politicization of the issue since the General Assembly apparently
would retain the option of referring the issue. Thus, under these
proposals, to some extent, the risk of a politically motivated
decision would shift to the General Assembly. 10 7
103. Id.
104. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
105. This risk is further heightened by the possibility that one body such as the
Security Council or General Assembly would apply one definition of aggression-for
instance, the definition in Resolution 3314-and the ICC would apply a different
definition. See, e.g., Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 63, 1 1-2 (proposing
different definitions of aggression to be used by the Security Council and ICC). Some
states argue that any definition the ICC adopts should not attempt to define aggression for
purposes of state responsibility, as that should be the province of the Security Council.
Comments of New Zealand, Ninth Preparatory Commission Session, Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression (April 15, 2002) (notes on file with the author). Yet, not
adopting a definition for state responsibility inherently implies that the Security Council or
General Assembly would apply a test such as Resolution 3314, and the ICC could be
applying a different test.
106. See supra Part IV.B.4.
107. The BH I Proposal risks politically-motivated determinations at another stage
because, under it, after the ICJ makes its decision, the matter would go back to the
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The BH II Proposal and option 5 of the Coordinator's
Discussion Paper eliminate the problem in one situation by
providing that, if the Security Council fails to act, and the ICJ
determines in a contentious case that a state committed
aggression, the matter would go directly to the ICC.10 8 While that
process would eliminate one step in which politically motivated
decisions could interfere, it is unclear whether that part of the
proposal would violate Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, which
provides that the Security Council10 9 or arguably, the General
Assembly as its proxy, must make determinations of state
responsibility for aggression." 0 Having the ICJ render either an
advisory opinion or a decision in a contentious case also would not
cure the risk of inconsistent determinations. Therefore, utilizing
the ICJ does not provide a complete solution.
2. Other Viable Alternatives?
Since involving another entity, such as the Security Council,
General Assembly or even the ICJ, in the determination of a
state's responsibility for aggression is so problematic, one must
ascertain if there are viable alternatives.
a. Have the ICC Determine When an Act of Aggression Occurred?
There is great initial appeal to the argument that the ICC
itself should determine when a state has committed an act of
aggression for purposes of going forward with an individual
prosecution. Upon closer examination, however, that approach
seems unrealistic.
First, there is a strong argument that such an approach would
violate Article 39 of the U.N. Charter which provides that the
"Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.... ."il The
counter-argument for why the ICC should be able to make such
General Assembly to decide whether to refer the matter to the ICC. See BH I Proposal,
supra note 79, j 5.
108. BH II Proposal, supra note 79, 6(b). Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra
note 63, option 5.
109. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
110. The argument in favor of the proposal would be that the ICJ would only be acting
after the Security Council failed to make a determination under Article 39. See BH 11
Proposal, supra note 79, J% 5-6. Thus, the ICJ would be acting as the Security Council's
proxy in the same way that the General Assembly may sometimes do. See supra note 101.
111. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (emphasis added).
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determinations would be that Article 39 is part of Chapter VII,
which covers enforcement measures and the Security Council's
role in maintaining international peace and security, and nothing
in Chapter VII relates to determinations of individual
responsibility;" 2 thus, the ICC should be free to make its own
determinations on jurisdictional issues or individual responsibility.
The problem, however, is that even a jurisdictional decision on
state responsibility would arguably violate the U.N. Charter,
because such a jurisdictional determination would inherently imply
that a state did in fact commit aggression.
Second, as a practical matter, members of both the Security
Council and General Assembly would most likely oppose a
proposal that allowed the ICC to make its own initial
determinations of aggression, for it would entirely eliminate both
bodies from the decision-making process.'1 3 There probably is
good reason for such opposition. Initial determinations of
aggression by the ICC have the potential for (a) undermining the
credibility of the Security Council if, for instance, the ICC
determines aggression has occurred at a state level but the Security
Council has done nothing about it, and (b) giving the ICC a far
greater role in political decision-making than was intended.
b. Prosecute for Other Crimes
When faced with a situation where aggression has likely
occurred but prosecution for aggression is not possible, an
alternate approach might be to prosecute the aggressor for another
crime. This becomes possible if either (a) aggression is defined,
but for some reason reference to the ICC is not made (e.g., the
Security Council or General Assembly determine that aggression
did not occur, fail to make any determination regarding
aggression, or fail to make a referral to the ICJ) or (b) if
aggression is never defined thus eliminating aggression
prosecutions.
112. U.N. CHARTER Ch. VII.
113. The BH I Proposal and BH II Proposal are more preferable in that respect
because under them, the ICJ renders an opinion only if the Security Council does not act.
See BH I Proposal, supra note 79, 4. See also BH II Proposal, supra note 79, 5-6.
Such a situation is far easier to defend under the U.N. Charter than one in which another
body, either the ICC or ICJ, would hear the matter without the Security Council first
being given the option to act.
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If a state commits aggression, other crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction will likely occur, especially if the aggression results in a
full-scale war. For example, "crimes against humanity" consist of
certain acts, including murder, when "committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population."11 4  States and other actors, unfortunately, target
civilians all too frequently during hostilities. If that practice were
widespread or systematic, the ICC might prosecute a perpetrator
for crimes against humanity instead of aggression.
War crimes may also occur during aggression. War crimes are
defined as various acts in particular when "committed as a part of
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes."11 5 The covered acts (which vary depending on whether
the conflict is international or internal) include, inter alia:
" directing attacks against the civilian population," 6
* [a]ttacking.. .towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings which are undefended and.. .not
military objectives," 7 and
* [i]ntentionally launching an attack in the
knowledge that such attack will cause incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians... which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated.'
1 8
Thus, a possible alternative to prosecuting aggression would
be to instead prosecute these other crimes. The advantage of such
prosecutions is that they would eliminate the need for any initial
determination prior to the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction because
the ICC Statute already defines these crimes. One negative
consequence, however, would be that not all perpetrators of
aggression necessarily have committed these other crimes.11 9
114. ICC Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7.
115. Id. at art. 8(1).
116. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(i).
117. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(v).
118. lId at art. 8(2)(b)(iv). These acts are covered in the context of an international
conflict. Similar acts are covered if there is an internal armed conflict. See id. at art.
8(2)(c), (e).
119. For instance, a civilian leader might make the decision to invade. Whether or not
a civilian leader would share criminal responsibility regarding war crimes or crimes against
humanity committed during the invasion would depend on whether the criteria for
imposing individual or command responsibility were met. Compare id. at art. 28(2)
(civilian command responsibility is met if the person had effective authority and control
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In considering whether states should abandon attempts to
include aggression in the ICC Statute and solely use the ICC to
prosecute other crimes, or prosecute other crimes only where the
mechanism to trigger the ICC's jurisdiction regarding aggression
fails, arguably the latter is the better approach. It would be
unfortunate for states to fail to define aggression, thereby creating
the perception that individual perpetrators of aggression may act
with impunity. It would also constitute acknowledgment of the
international community's failure to come to grips with this most
serious crime.120 Perhaps the best scenario would be to define
aggression while recognizing that the definition may work
imperfectly because of the way the ICC's jurisdiction is triggered,
and that when the ICC's jurisdiction is not triggered, alternative
charges may be possible.
c. Attempt to "Depoliticize" the Political Process
Another question arises as to whether anything can be done
to "depoliticize" the process and achieve a neutral application of
the law, given the apparent need to involve the Security Council
(and/or General Assembly) in determining when a state
committed aggression. 121 In a different context, a noted scholar
has stressed the need for "clarity and transparency" as "so
important for criminal law."'122 It is precisely some notion of
clarity and transparency that must be instilled into the decision-
making to achieve consistency in application. If the Security
Council faces a decision as to whether a state committed
aggression, it should state what criteria it is applying. Ideally, the
Security Council would also offer an explanation of which criteria
over the military; knew or consciously disregarded information about the crimes; and
failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent them); with id. at art. 28(1)
(stating a different standard for military commander).
120. Although the U.N. Charter provides various mechanisms for dealing with states
that commit aggression, it is clear those mechanisms do not create a sufficient deterrent.
As the Cameroons so eloquently argued at a recent session, aggression is a truly
international crime because it is the only crime states cannot address within their internal
legal systems. Comments of the Cameroons, Ninth Preparatory Commission Session,
working Group on the Crime of Aggression (April 16, 2002) (notes on file with the
author).
121. As one author bluntly stated: "It would defeat the purpose of the ICC to have
only those nations not members or friends of the permanent five as potential defendants in
the Court." Sadat & Carden, supra note 3, at 443.
122. See MERON, supra note 98, at 242 (discussing the "grave breaches system" in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949).
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were violated and why. These explanations could prevent the
perception that the Security Council was acting arbitrarily.
Moreover, use of such precedent might even prompt the Security
Council to act consistently when making determinations regarding
aggression. Ample referrals to the ICJ could also help achieve a
more neutral and less politically-motivated process. In this
respect, the proposal, originally presented by the Netherlands, to
have referrals to the ICJ made by nine members of the Security
Council seems quite useful.123 Above all, it is pivotal to continue
exploring methods of achieving consistency as to when the ICC
would hear cases regarding the crime of aggression. 124
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to define the crime of aggression. Yet, the
greater challenge involves establishing procedures to trigger the
ICC's jurisdiction. If a political body (the Security Council or
General Assembly) decides when a case of aggression reaches the
ICC, the potential for politically motivated decisions threatens to
undermine the ICC's credibility. At the same time, it is extremely
important to define aggression so that perpetrators may be
prosecuted and would-be perpetrators potentially deterred. While
aggression goes unpunished, a part of the legacy of the Nuremberg
Tribunal remains unfulfilled, and one of the core principles in the
U.N. Charter continues to be violated. With the historic advent of
the ICC's creation, the world will have a chance to fulfill this
legacy. Much work, though, remains to be done so that aggression
may be defined in a way that is both consistent with the U.N.
Charter and minimizes the dangers of politicizing the process.
123. See Netherlands Proposal, supra note 80; see also Cordinator's Discussion Paper,
supra note 63, option 4(b).
124. It is also hoped that the Security Council and General Assembly will act
decisively in determining whether aggression has occurred. A potential problem may
occur if, for instance, the Security Council resolutions condemn situations as threatening
"international peace and security," but fail to use the word aggression. If denominating a
situation as "aggression" creates individual exposure to criminal charges, the Security
Council may grow even more wary of condemning acts as "aggression." For this reason
also, it is important to have adequate fallback mechanisms.
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APPENDIX A
Excerpted from the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/L.4/Rev.1, with the permission of Anne Cunningham
at the United Nations.
Crime of aggression [Original: English]
(Prepared on the basis of the discussion papers proposed by the
Coordinator)1
Consolidated text of proposals on the crime of aggression
Definition of the crime of aggression
Option 1
1. For the purposes of the present Statute, [and subject to a
determination by the Security Council regarding the act of a
State,] the crime of aggression means [the use of the armed force,
including the initiation thereof, by an individual who is in a
position of exercising control or directing the political or military
action of a State, against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of a State in violation of the Charter of the
United Nations.] any of the following acts committed by [an
individual] [a person] who is in a position of exercising control or




[an armed attack] [the use of armed force] [a war of aggression] [a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
1. The consolidated text of proposals on the crime of aggression was issued at the
third session of the Preparatory Commission and the preliminary list of possible issues




Excerpted from the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/L.4/Rev.1, with the permission of Anne Cunningham
at the United Nations.
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing] against
another State [against another State, or depriving other peoples of
their rights to self-determination], in [manifest] contravention of
the Charter of the United Nations, to violate [to threaten or to
violate] the [sovereignty,] territorial integrity or political
independence of that State [or the inalienable rights of those
people] [except when this is, required by the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples and the rights of
individual or collective self-defence]
Variation 2
an armed attack directed by a State against the territorial integrity
or political independence of another State when this armed attack
was undertaken in manifest contravention of the Charter of the
United Nations with the object or result of establishing a military
occupation of, or annexing, the territory of such other State or part
thereof by armed forces of the attacking State.
Variation 3
Add the following paragraph to paragraph 1, variation 1,
above:
2. Provided that the acts concerned or their consequences are
of sufficient gravity, [acts constituting aggression include] [the use
of the armed force includes] [are] the following [whether preceded
by a declaration of war or not]:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of
a territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or
part thereof;
2002]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
APPENDIX A
Excerpted from the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/L.4/Rev.1, with the permission of Anne Cunningham
at the United Nations.
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against
the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade [of the ports or coasts] of a State by the
armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land,
sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within
the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other
State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts
listed before, or its substantial involvement therein.
3. When an attack [the use of armed force] under paragraph I







Excerpted from the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/L.4/Rev.1, with the permission of Anne Cunningham
at the United Nations.
thereof by an individual who is in a position of exercising control
or capable of directing the political or military action of a State
shall also constitute a crime of aggression.
Option 2
For the purposes of the present Statute and subject to a
prior determination by the United Nations Security Council of an
act of aggression by the State concerned, the crime of aggression
means any of the following acts: planning, preparing, initiating or
carrying out a war of aggression.
Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction
Option 1
1. The Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to
the crime of aggression in accordance with the provisions of article
13 of the Statute.
2. The Security Council shall determine the existence of
an act of aggression perpetrated by the State whose national is
concerned in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations before proceedings take place in
the Court with regard to the crime of aggression.
3. The Security Council, acting in accordance with article
13 (b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, shall first
make a decision establishing that an act of aggression has been
committed by the State whose national is concerned.
4. The Court, upon receipt of a complaint relating to the
crime of aggression under article 13 (a) or (c), shall, with due
regard to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, first request the Security Council to determine
2002]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
APPENDIX A
Excerpted from the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/L.4/Rev.1, with the permission of Anne Cunningham
at the United Nations.
whether or not an act of aggression has been committed by the
State whose national is concerned.
5. The Security Council shall make a decision upon this
request within [6] [12] months.
6. Notification of this decision shall be made by letter
from the President of the Security Council to the President of the
International Criminal Court without delay.
Variation 1
7. In the absence of a decision of the Security Council
within the time frame referred to in paragraph 5 above, the Court
may proceed.
8. The decision of the Security Council under paragraph 5
above shall not be interpreted as in any way affecting the
independence of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with
regard to the crime of aggression.
Variation 2
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, in
the absence of a decision by the Security Council within the time
frame referred to in paragraph 5 above, the Court shall, with due
regard to the provisions of articles 12, 14 and 24 of the Charter,
request the General Assembly of the United Nations to make a
recommendation.
8. The General Assembly shall make such a




Excerpted from the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/L.4/Rev.1, with the permission of Anne Cunningham
at the United Nations.
9. Notification of this recommendation shall be made by
letter from the President of the General Assembly to the President
of the International Criminal Court without delay.
10. In the absence of such a recommendation within the
time frame referred to in paragraph 8 above, the Court may
proceed.
11. The decision of the Security Council under paragraph 5
above or the recommendation of the General Assembly under
paragraph 8 above shall not be interpreted as in any way affecting
the independence of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
with regard to the crime of aggression.
Option 2
1. The Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to
the crime of aggression subject to a determination by the Security
Council in accordance with article 39 of the Charter, that an act of
aggression has been committed by the State concerned.
2. When a complaint related to the crime of aggression
has been lodged, the Court shall first seek to discover whether a
determination has been made by the Security Council with regard
to the alleged aggression by the State concerned and, if not, it will
request, subject to the provisions of the Statute, the Security
Council to proceed to such a determination.
3. If the Security Council does not make such a
determination or does not make use of article 16 of the Statute
within 12 months of the request, the Court shall proceed with the
case in question.
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Option 3
For the purposes of the present Statute and subject to a
prior determination by the United Nations Security Council of an
act of aggression by the State concerned, the crime of aggression
means any of the following acts: planning, preparing, initiating or
carrying out a war of aggression.
